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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-40 ("the savings statute") limits a 
plaintiff to only one refiling after a failure of the action not on the merits. 
2. Whether an action properly refiled pursuant to the savings statute, which 
includes a different party, relates back to the date of the original filing. 
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is Hebertson v. Bank One Utah, 1999 
UT App 342, 383 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a), which allows the Utah Supreme Court to review a 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The decision by the Court of Appeals, which this Court 
has jurisdiction to review, was issued on December 2, 1999. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provision in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, the 
savings statute. That statutory provision reads as follows: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40. 
The rules setting forth the form and content of a petition for writ of certiorari are also 
governing here. Those rules—Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46 and 49—are too 
lengthy to set forth in their entirety here, and are therefore included in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 31, 1988, Randi Hebertson accompanied her daughter on a visit to a 
chiropractor at Willowcreek Plaza in Salt Lake County. Willowcreek Plaza was a 
professional office complex. As Ms. Hebertson walked on the sidewalk at Willowcreek 
Plaza she fell on accumulated ice. She had immediate problems with her back and since that 
time has had three back surgeries, all as a result of her fall. 
Ms. Hebertson contacted the manager of Willowcreek Plaza within three days after 
the accident and was referred to an adjustor at State Farm Insurance, the insurer for the 
propeity, to arrange for the payment of her medical bills and for consideration of her claim 
for injury. As months passed and it became evident that her injuries were quite severe and 
would require surgery, she contacted an attorney. In the months and years following the 
accident, information as to Ms. Hebertson's injuries was passed on to State Farm and it 
investigated the claim. 
Nearly four years after the accident Ms. Hebertson's condition had still not stabilized 
to a point that allowed meaningful settlement negotiations between State Farm and Ms. 
Hebertson. Ms. Hebertson's former attorneys filed a Complaint alleging negligence against 
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Willowcreek Plaza on November 24, 1992. The four year statute of limitations ran 
December 31, 1992. 
That Complaint named "Willowcreek Plaza" as defendant. A copy of the Complaint 
and Summons was served upon one of the managers of Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., which, at 
the time the Complaint was filed, owned the office complex. (At the time of the accident, 
the property had been owned by Valley Bank & Trust Company and Dime Savings Bank). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. The court granted the motion, without prejudice, since 
service of the Complaint upon the actual owners of the property did not occur within 120 
days after the filing of the Complaint. The Order was entered on September 1, 1993. 
Two weeks later, on September 17, 1993, Ms. Hebertson, through her former 
attorneys, refiled a Complaint relying on the savings statute. Ms. Hebertson again named 
Willowcreek Plaza as defendant. She timely served Valley Bank & Trust Company and 
Dime Savings Bank since they were the actual owners of the property at the time of her fall. 
Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank were 
not doing business as Willowcreek Plaza and therefore could not be sued by that common 
name. The trial court granted the motion on January 28, 1994. 
Ms. Hebertson filed a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 1994. The Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Order of the trial court on May 11, 1995. Hebertson v. Willowcreek 
Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Ms. Hebertson filed a Notice of Appeal to this 
Court on June 16, 1995. This Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals on 
September 20, 1996. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). 
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Ms. Hebertson's former attorneys refiled the action underlying this appeal on May 23, 
1997. The case, Civil No. 970903637P1, was assigned to Judge Hanson. The Complaint 
named Valley Bank & Tmst and Dime Savings Bank as defendants. Judge Hanson granted 
summary judgment to the defendants concluding that (a) the savings statute did not permit 
more than one refiling, and (b) that, in any event, the addition of new parties to an action 
refiled under the savings statute did not relate back to the original filing. 
A Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed on May 7, 1998. On September 4, 1998, 
this Court assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Following briefing, the Court 
of Appeals heard argument in this case on May 17, 1999, and issued a decision and written 
opinion in the case on December 2, 1999. In that decision, the Court of Appeals reversed 
Judge Hanson's entry of summary judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the savings statute, by its 
terms, permits more than one refiling, and that a refiling that adds new parties relates back 
to the original filing so long as there exists an identity of interest between the original parties 
and the new parties. The Court of Appeals held that the new defendants—Bank One 
(formerly known as Valley Bank) and Dime Savings Bank—had a sufficient identity of 
interest with the original named defendant—Willowcreek Plaza—and were sufficiently 
alerted to the existence of the litigation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that 
Hebertson's 1997 complaint was timely and properly filed. 
On January 3, 2000, Dime Savings Bank and Bank One (hereinafter "Petitioners") 
filed a petition with this Court seeking a writ of certiorari. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 31, 1988, defendants Bank One, Utah, N.A., fka Valley Bank 
& Trust Company, and Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB, owned, operated or 
supervised the operation of an office complex located in Salt Lake County, Utah, under a 
variety of names, including Willowcreek Plaza, Willowcreek Shopping Village, Ltd., and 
Willowcreek Plaza Executive Offices. (R.2) 
2. Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent Randi Hebertson was walking on a sidewalk 
at the Willowcreek Plaza on December 31, 1988 when she tripped and fell on accumulated 
ice. As a result of the fall, Ms. Hebertson suffered serious injury to her back. She has 
undergone three major back surgeries in an attempt to repair the damage caused by the fall. 
The attempts have failed. Her injuries are serious, permanent, and disabling. She now walks 
with a cane whereas before the fall she engaged in a variety of recreational and other 
physical activities integral to her role as wife, mother and provider for her family. (R. 2, 32-
33). 
3. Within three or four days after the fall, Ms. Hebertson contacted State Farm 
Insurance Company, the insurer for the defendants' commercial property, regarding payment 
for Ms. Hebertson's injuries. (R. 3, 32-33). 
4. The first complaint against Willowcreek Plaza was filed in November 1992, 
shortly before the statute of limitations ran, in order to preserve the case while negotiations 
with State Farm continued. (R. 3-5). 
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5. Ms. Hebertson suffered a series of procedural problems in going forward with 
the merits of her case. To this day Ms. Hebertson has never had an opportunity to present 
the merits of her case to a judge or jury. (R. 16, 33). 
6. This first complaint named "Willowcreek Plaza" as the sole named defendant; 
Hebertson served the complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., the owner of the premises at 
the time the complaint was filed. (R. 3, 15, 71). 
7. Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., was not the owner of the propeity at the time of the 
accident. On December 31, 1988, the propeity in question was owned by Valley Bank and 
Dime Savings Bank. (R. 72-73). 
8. Hebertsoif s original complaint was dismissed by the district court, without 
prejudice, on September 22, 1993. (R. 3-4). 
9. Hebertson filed a second complaint on September 17, 1993, again naming 
"Willowcreek Plaza" as the sole defendant in the caption of the complaint, but naming in the 
body of the complaint Dime Savings Bank and Bank One (the successor to Valley Bank). 
In addition, Hebertson served a copy of the complaint on Dime Savings Bank and Bank One. 
(R. 4, 15, 56). 
10. On January 17, 1994, the district court dismissed the second complaint, 
without prejudice. (R. 4). 
11. Hebertson elected to appeal the district court's dismissal of this second 
complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the dismissal, see Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and this Court affirmed the decision 
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of the Court of Appeals, see Hebeitson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). 
This Court's affirmance was dated September 20, 1996. 
12. Hebertson filed the complaint that forms the basis for this action on May 23, 
1997. In this complaint, Hebertson named Bank One and Dime Savings Bank as defendants, 
and served the complaint on them. (R. 1-7). 
13. Bank One and Dime Savings Bank asked the district court to dismiss the 
complaint, on the ground that the Utah savings statute—Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40—allows 
only one refiling, and that even if it did not, the new refiling could not name additional 
parties not named in the original complaint. (R. 12-20). 
14. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on March 13, 1998, and 
entered an order to that effect on April 8, 1998. (R. 83, 92). 
15. Hebertson filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. (R. 83). 
16. On December 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing the 
judgment of the district court, and remanding the case for trial. 
17. On January 3, 2000, Petitioners filed a petition with this Court, seeking a writ 
of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In support of their petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioners Dime Savings Bank and 
Bank One have simply submitted, nearly verbatim, the same brief they submitted to the Utah 
Court of Appeals when that court heard argument on the merits of this case. In other words, 
Petitioners have, in support of their petition for writ of certiorari, simply resubmitted their 
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meiits bnef, and have completely neglected to make any showing, as lequiied by Utah Rules 
of Appellate Pioceduie 46 and 49, legarding any "special and important leasons" why this 
Court should take this case This failuie on the part of the Petitioneis dooms then petition 
on two separate grounds First, Rule 49(e) cleaily states that failuie to follow the piecise 
lequuements of Rules 46 and 49 is sufficient reason to deny the petition Second, and moie 
substantively, Petitioneis have utteily failed to cany then buiden of demonstiating to this 
Court why this case is important and unique enough to justify expendituie of this Court's 
scaice lesomces 
ARGUMENT 
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE CRITERIA 
SET FORTH IN RULE 46(A) IS MET HERE 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Proceduie clearly state that "[rjeview by a writ of 
certioian is not a mattei of light, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important leasons " Utah R App P 46(a) Many state supieme courts, 
including this Court, have followed the lead of the United States Supieme Court and have 
instituted certioian pioceduies m oidei to caiefully husband then scaice lesources These 
certioian pioceduies aie aimed at weeding out the oidinary cases, so that Supreme Court 
lesomces aie spent only on cases of some importance Cf City of Oklahoma City v Turtle, 
471 U S 808, 816, 85 L Ed 2d 791, 799 (1985) (stating that the "decision to grant certioian 
lepiesents a commitment of scaice judicial lesomces with a view to deciding the meiits of 
one oi moie of the questions piesented in the petition") The certioian pioceduies of this 
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Court are set forth in Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 45-51. Specifically, Rules 46 and 
49 set forth the considerations governing this Court's decision whether to grant a writ of 
certiorari in a particular case. 
Rule 46(a) describes four types of cases that this Court may find particularly 
important. First, this Court may grant a writ of certiorari "[w]hen a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law." Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(1). Second, this Court may 
choose to examine a case in which "a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." 
Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2). Third, this Court may elect to hear a case in which "a panel of the 
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Utah R. App. 
P. 46(a)(3). Finally, this Court may grant a writ of certiorari "[w]hen the Court of Appeals 
has decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(4). 
Rule 49 requires that a petitioner seeking a writ of certiorari include in its petition "a 
direct and concise argument explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 
46 for the issuance of the writ." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9). This requirement is not 
voluntary—the Rule requires that "[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain" the 
direct and concise argument regarding the Rule 46 criteria. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a) 
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(emphasis added); see also Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 
1983) (stating that the word "shall" is "usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted 
as such previously in this and other jurisdictions"). Indeed, Rule 49 itself provides that a 
petitioner who fails to comply with the dictates of the Rules may have its petition denied 
solely on those grounds. Rule 49(e) states that "[t]he failure of a petitioner to present with 
accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and adequate understanding of 
the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying the petition." Utah 
R. App. P. 49(e). 
Petitioners Dime Savings Bank and Bank One have utterly failed to comply with the 
requirements of these rules. In their petition, Petitioners do not even mention Rules 46 or 
49, and do not even bother to argue that any of the Rule 46 criteria are met here. Rather, 
Petitioners have submitted, nearly verbatim, the exact same brief they submitted to the Utah 
Court of Appeals when that court heard argument on the merits of the case.1 This procedure 
violates the clear mandate of Rule 49, which clearly requires that Petitioners address the Rule 
46 criteria in their petition. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9). And Rule 49(e), by itself, 
provides sufficient reason for this Court to deny Petitioners' petition. 
*The changes Petitioners have made to their Court of Appeals merits brief, before 
submitting essentially that same brief to this Court, deal chiefly with the removal of 
certain rebuttal argument. This rebuttal argument was included in Petitioners' merits 
brief below, because Petitioners were the Appellees there, and their merits brief was a 
response to Hebertson's Appellant's Brief. Now, before this Court, Petitioners are the 
first party to file a brief, and have therefore excised those portions of their merits brief 
below which contained response argument. With this chief exception, the remainder of 
Petitioners' petition is copied largely verbatim from their merits brief below. 
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More substantively, however, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate to this Court why 
it should expend scarce judicial resources on hearing and deciding this particular case. This 
Court presumably has only a finite amount of resources, and has therefore mandated that 
parties seeking to invoke this Court's discretionary authority must affirmatively set forth the 
reasons why time, energy, and money should be devoted to deciding this particular case. If 
Petitioners cannot muster such an argument in their petition, despite the fact that such an 
argument is mandated by clear rule, then this Court should not expend still further resources 
in trying to ascertain whether this case is important enough to consider. 
Because Petitioners have utterly failed to carry their burden of demonstrating why this 
case is "special and important," see Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9), this Court should deny 
Petitioners' petition.2 
2Although Petitioners are allowed, by rule, to file a reply brief in support of their 
petition if they so choose, Petitioners cannot resurrect arguments in that reply brief that 
they did not raise at all in their petition. "[A]s a general rule, [this Court] will not 
consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief" Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 
P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988) (citing Romrell v. Zions First NatT Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 
395 (Utah 1980)). This is the rule followed by federal appellate courts as well. See State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that issues 
not raised in an appellant's opening brief are considered waived). 
Indeed, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confine a reply brief to "arguments 
first raised in the brief in opposition." Utah R. App. P. 50(e); see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(c). Because Petitioners have not argued that certiorari is warranted in this case under 
any of the specific criteria set forth in Rule 46(a), Hebertson has no obligation to imagine 
and rebut the arguments Petitioners might have made had they complied with the rules. 
Therefore, the issue of the appropriateness of the Rule 46(a) factors has been raised in 
neither the petition itself nor the brief in opposition. Under the cases cited above, and 
under the plain language of Rule 50(e), Petitioners may not raise the issue of the 
appropriateness of the Rule 46(a) factors in a reply brief Thus, any attempt by 
Petitioners to make the argument, in a reply brief, required by Rules 46 and 49 should not 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari is deficient in several respects. Tellingly, 
Petitioners have not even attempted to describe for this Court any of the reasons why it 
should grant a writ of certiorari and hear this case. Rather, Petitioners have merely submitted 
a near-verbatim copy of their merits brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioners have failed 
to comply with the plain dictates of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and have failed 
to carry their burden of demonstrating to this Court why it should spend resources on this 
case. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Petitioners' petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this / . day of February, 2000. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
By_ \\c<y^— 
Timothy C. Houpt 
Ryan M. Harris 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent 
be countenanced by this Court. 
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delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR REVIEW OF 
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Tab A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Randi Hebertson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
FILED 
DEC 0 2 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Bank One, Utah, N.A., fka 
Valley Bank & Trust Company; 
et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 980226-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 2, 1999) 
j 1999 UT App 342 i 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: Timothy C. Houpt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Daniel L. Steele and John Clyde Hansen, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Hi Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals the trial court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants Bank One, Utah, formerly 
known as Valley Bank & Trust Company (Bank One), and Dime Savings 
Bank of New York, FSB (Dime Savings). Because we conclude that 
the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), permits a 
plaintiff to refile timely successive actions after each is 
dismissed, so long as the dismissal is not on the merits and the 
refiled action is substantially the same as the previous action, 
we reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
1|2 "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here 
the appellant[]." Parker v. Dodaion, 971 P.2d 496, 496-97 (Utah 
1998) . 
%3 This appeal affords this court a second occasion to consider 
Ms. Hebertson's attempt to recover for injuries sustained in 
1988. On December 31 of that year, while accompanying her 
daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a professional 
office complex in Salt Lake County, Hebertson slipped and fell on 
some ice, sustaining an injury to her back that required multiple 
surgeries. Within the next three days, Hebertson contacted the 
building manager, who referred her to the building's insurance 
carrier, State Farm Insurance. Having been unable to reach a 
settlement of her claim with the insurer, Hebertson filed a 
complaint against "Willowcreek Plaza11 approximately one month 
before the statute of limitations was to expire and served 
process upon a manager employed by Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. As it 
turned out, however, although Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. owned the 
office complex when the complaint was filed, at the time of the 
accident it was owned by Bank One and Dime Savings, which had 
acquired it by foreclosure.1 
1|4 On the motion of Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, the trial court 
dismissed this first action without prejudice. Relying on the 
savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), Hebertson 
filed a second complaint, again naming "Willowcreek Plaza" in the 
caption as the defendant, but naming in the body of the complaint 
and serving Bank One and Dime Savings. See Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996). Bank One and 
Dime Savings contended they could not be sued under the name 
Willowcreek Plaza and moved to dismiss. The trial court granted 
the motion. See id. Although Hebertson objected to dismissal of 
this action, she did not move to amend the complaint to conform 
the parties named in the caption to those described in the 
complaintfs body. Rather, she insisted that Bank One and Dime 
Savings were doing business under the name Willowcreek Plaza and 
thus could be sued under that name. See id. See generally Utah 
R. Civ. P. 17(d). In Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 
839, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this court rejected that 
contention and upheld the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed our decision.2 See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 
P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996). 
1|5 Within a year of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the 
second complaint's dismissal, and again relying on the savings 
statute, Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, naming Bank One 
1. At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for defendants 
confirmed that defendants and Willowcreek, L.C. had the same 
insurer and attorney. 
2. After dismissal of the second complaint, Hebertson again 
relied on the savings statute and filed a third complaint, naming 
Bank One and Dime Savings in the caption as defendants. However, 
electing to appeal the second complaint's dismissal, Hebertson 
never served and, ultimately, voluntarily dismissed the third 
complaint. 
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and Dime Savings as defendants in both the caption and body. On 
June 16, 1997, Bank One and Dime Savings were served with a 
summons and a copy of this fourth complaint. Bank One' and Dime 
Savings moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b) (6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the savings statute did 
not apply beyond a single refiling and the action was therefore 
barred by the statute of limitations. Hebertson opposed the 
motion, arguing that the savings statute allows multiple 
refilings. Because it considered matters outside the pleadings, 
the trial court correctly treated the motion as one for summary 
judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56(c); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, 
Ross & Co. , 926 P.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Utah 1996), and granted 
'summary judgment in favor of Bank One and Dime Savings. The 
trial court ruled that the savings statute allows only a single 
refiling and that even if multiple refilings were allowed, 
Hebertson could not include new defendants in the refiled action. 
Hebertson again appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%G "fSummary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.f Because the question of whether 
summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law, we accord 
no deference to the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah 1998) (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)). 
MULTIPLE REFILINGS UNDER THE SAVINGS STATUTE 
^1 This case squarely presents us for the first time with the 
issue of whether the savings statute permits a plaintiff to file 
more than one new action after a dismissal not on the merits.3 
To resolve this issue we must construe Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-4 0 
(1996). 
%8 "In matters of statutory construction, f [t]he best evidence 
of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting 
[an] Act is the plain language of the Act.1" Platts v. Parents 
3. Although in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State 
University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court 
intimated that section 78-12-40 may not permit successive 
refilings, see id. at 1221 n.10, we concluded the issue was not 
ripe for adjudication and expressly stated "it would not be 
proper for this court to render a definitive opinion on the 
permissibility of refiling an action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-40 more than once." Id. at 1220-21. 
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Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). 
See also Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. , 
964 P. 2d 335, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) («" [W] here the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, [the court] will not look 
beyond it to divine legislative intent.'") (quoting Utah Sign, 
Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633-34 (Utah 1995)). 
Moreover, we "assume that 'each term in the statute was used 
advisedly.1" Id. (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax 
Common, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). 
1)9 The Utah savings statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff 
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year after 
the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). By beginning with the word 
"if," the statute suggests a set of conditions will follow.4 It 
then recites conditions, the occurrence of which invokes the 
application of the statutory consequences. The conditions are: 
(1) "any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed;" or (2) "the plaintiff 
fails in such action [--i.e., any action commenced within due 
time--]or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits;" 
and (3) the applicable limitations period has expired. Id. See 
also Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding savings statute did not apply where 
action was dismissed within original limitations period). 
^10 Because the first two conditi ons were drafted in the 
disjunctive, Hebertson need only satisfy one of them and the 
Third condition for the statute to apply. The third condition 
was clearly satisfied here because the limitations period had 
long since expired. See Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 1390. Because 
there was no reversal of a judgment for Hebertson, and thus the 
4. For example, Webster's defines "if" as synonymous with "in 
the event that: in case" and "so long as: on condition that." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1124 (1976). Cf. 
Black's Law Dictionary 746 (6th ed. 1990) ("In deeds and wills, 
this word, as a rule, implies a condition precedent[.]"). 
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first condition does not apply, if Hebertson satisfies the second 
alternative condition--!.e., that "the plaintiff fails in [any 
action commenced within due time] otherwise than upon the 
merits"--the savings statute applies. Here, because the trial 
court dismissed the second complaint without prejudice, the 
action did not fail on the merits. The question remains whether 
it was filed "within due time." If it was, the action commenced 
with plaintifffs fourth complaint was timely because it was filed 
within one year of the Utah Supreme Court's affirmance of the 
dismissal of plaintiff's second complaint. If the second action 
was not filed "within due time" for purposes of the savings 
statute, plaintiff had no right to file the fourth complaint. 
Ull Our Supreme Court has already held that, for purposes of the 
savings statute, an action is "commenced" when the new complaint 
is filed. See Muir v. W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 851 P.2d 645, 
647 (Utah 1993). Further, the term "within" denotes "on the 
inside or on the inner side" and "inside the bounds of a place or 
region," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2627 
(1976), while "due" refers to that which is "[j]ust; proper; 
regular; lawful; sufficient." Black's Law Dictionary 499 (6th 
ed. 1990). Hence, an "action commenced within due time" refers 
to an action filed inside the period of time authorized by lav;. 
Hl2 Defendants would have us equate "action commenced within due 
time" narrowly, i.e., as being an action commenced within the 
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. This view 
overlooks that the savings statute itself establishes a time 
frame within which to file an action, indeed, an action that 
would be untimely under the statute of limitations. Accordingly, 
we believe that Hebertson's second action was "commenced within 
due time" when she filed it within the year authorized by the 
savings statute. 
Hl3 The plain language of section 78-12-40 is simply no bar to 
serial recourse to the savings statute. Therefore, Hebertson's 
fourth action was timely because it was brought within one year 
of the failure, not on the merits, of her second action, which 
had been filed "within due time" under the savings statute. 
Simply stated, if the Legislature meant to limit the savings 
statute to a single use per cause of action, it would have 
avoided general phraseology like "within due time" and stated its 
intention clearly, a simple thing to do. See, e.g., Ga. Code 
Ann. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1998) (providing that "this privilege of 
renewal shall be exercised only once"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-
105 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing refiling only for those actions 
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that failed other than on the merits and were "commenced within 
the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation").5 
Hl4 Consistent with the dicta in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. 
Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), see 
supra note 3, Bank One and Dime Savings argue that the statute's 
use of singular articles--i.e., "may commence a new action within 
one year after the reversal or failure"--contemplates only one 
refiling.6 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added). 
5. We acknowledge that some courts in other states have reached 
the opposite conclusion when reviewing their own savings 
statutes. Nonetheless, because these decisions interpret 
statutes with language distinct from that in our savings statute, 
these interpretations are unpersuasive. See, e.g.. Estate of 
Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 581 A.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Conn. 1990) 
(holding that the multiple refilings expressly authorized by 
Connecticut's savings statute must all be made within one year of 
the failure of the first action, described by the statute as the 
"original action"); Worley v. Pierce, 440 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that by stating the "privilege of renewal 
shall be exercised only once," the savings statute permitted only 
one refiling); Foster v. Pettiiohn, 213 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 
1948) (holding that its statute allowing refiling "from time to 
time, within one year" permitted multiple refilings, but not 
beyond the one-year savings period). We also recognize that 
other jurisdictions have determined that their statutes, which 
are more similar to Utah's, do not permit multiple refilings. 
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Steinberg, 505 N.E.2d 28, 29 (111- App. 
Ct. 1987) (holding that the statute did not permit multiple 
refilings although it "d[id] not contain express limitations on 
the number of voluntary dismissals and refilings available"); 
Denton v. City of Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute 
did not permit successive refilings after the initial one-year 
savings period); Hull v. Rich, 854 P.2d 903, 904 (Okla. 1993) 
(statute permitted only one refiling). Nevertheless, we find 
these decisions ultimately unpersuasive, largely because they 
turn more on policy considerations than plain meaning. In Utah, 
courts are not so quick to veer from a statute's plain meaning 
and undertake a foray into the realm of policy. See, e.g., Olsen 
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) 
("'Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language 
need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations.'") (quoting World Peace Movement of Am. v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)). 
6. Defendants do not address the rule of statutory construction 
in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (Supp. 1999), which provides 
that "[t]he singular number includes the plural, and the plural 
(continued...) 
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We believe such an inference is neutralized by the statute's 
prior reference to "any action . . . commenced within due time." 
Id. (emphasis added). See Websterfs Third New International 
Dictionary 97 (1976) (defining "any" as "one indifferently out of 
more than two[,] one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind" 
and stating it is "used as a function word especially] in 
interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is 
not a particular or definite individual of the given category"). 
Although other courts have construed similar language to permit a 
plaintiff to file only one new action, see United States Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 53 P.2d 284, 285-88 (Okla. 1935) (holding 
that "commence a new action" did not authorize multiple 
refilings), such a result is not universal. See Sharp Bros. 
Contracting Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 817 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo. Ct. 
App.) (noting that "'a new action' [does not] mean only one new 
action") (emphasis added), cert, denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 662 
(Colo. 1991). 
^15 We reject defendants' contention that our decision will make 
the course of lawsuits uncertain or open the floodgates on the 
stream of litigation. Plaintiffs have little natural interest in 
filing multiple unproductive actions or paying multiple filing 
fees. Moreover, the savings statute is limited to actions that 
are not resolved on the merits and to circumstances where an 
action was originally brought within the limitations period. 
Further, multiple refilings in cases such as these are rarely 
needed because generally plaintiffs will be given the opportunity 
to simply amend their complaints to remedy these kinds of 
deficiencies. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), 21; Sulzen v. Williams, 
977 P.2d 497, 501-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (concluding trial court 
abused its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint so 
that caption would name correct parties, which were described in 
body). Moreover, if any action is filed "for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation," the party and/or 
counsel may be sanctioned. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (1) . 
Hl6 Because the Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of 
Hebertson's second complaint occurred less than one year before 
Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, that complaint was timely 
under the savings statute. The terms of the savings statute do 
not include a "once per customer" limitation. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred in concluding that Hebertson's fourth complaint 
was barred by the statute of limitations. 
6. (...continued) 
the singular." 
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ADDITION OF "NEW" PARTIES 
1|l7 We now turn to Bank One and Dime Savings's argument that 
even if we permit successive refilings under the savings statute, 
Bank One and Dime Savings could not be added as new parties in 
the fourth action. Their general position in this regard has 
merit. Unlike statutes of limitation that provide a general time 
period in which a plaintiff may file any action arising out of a 
given occurrence, the savings statute affords a means only to 
renew the earlier action. Consequently, the "saving statute does 
not apply when the new action is brought against a different 
defendant than was the first one, or by a different plaintiff." 
"51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 820-21 (1970) . 
See Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983) (holding that to 
invoke the savings statute, the party bringing the subsequent 
saved action must have been a "party to the original lawsuit who 
had affirmatively sought relief therein"). Thus, the refiled 
action is "new" only in the sense that it results from the filing 
of a different complaint. See Black's Law Dictionary 1042 (6th 
ed. 1990) (explaining that "new" "ordinarily . . . is a purely 
relative term and is employed in contrasting the date, origin, or 
character of one thing with the corresponding attributes of 
another thing of the same kind or class") .7 
7. Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language 
is the rule "that a statute should be construed as a whole, with 
all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other 
and with the overall legislative objective of the statute." 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) ("The statutes . . . and all 
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."); 
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (" [A] ny 
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other 
statutory provisions is improper."); Ferro v. Utah Dep't of 
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting 
interpretation that would "rewrite the Act and impermissibly 
render [another section] a complete nullity"). Without the 
requirement that the claims be substantially the same, a lazy 
plaintiff could easily avoid the diligence that statutes of 
limitation are meant to promote by filing an action at the 
eleventh hour against anybody; then filing a notice of dismissal 
before service or obtaining a dismissal for failure to prosecute, 
using the extra time to figure out who to sue; and then filing a 
new complaint a year later. Such a result would eviscerate our 
statutes of limitation and undermine their purpose of 
"requir[ing] that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut 
them is still fresh" and would burden courts and parties with 
"'stale' claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago 
(continued...) 
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Ul8 However, the prevailing view is that the prior and refiled 
actions need only be substantially the same. Thus, "a change of 
parties does not preclude an application of the statute where the 
change is merely nominal or the interest represented in the 
renewed action [is] identical with that in the original action." 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 821 (1970) . This 
is consistent with the approach taken in a closely related 
context. When a pleading is amended after expiration of the 
limitations period, such amendment will relate back to the 
original filing if it "merely restates in a different form the 
cause of action originally pleaded." Id. § 234, at 787. See 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). 
Because the basic inquiry is the same for determining whether a 
"change" in defendants is within the scope of the savings statute 
as it is for determining if such a change relates back under Rule 
15(c), we adopt the same test.8 That is, just as with the 
relation back of an amendment, a refiled action is substantially 
the same as the original and is thus authorized by the savings 
statute where the new and old "[p]arties have an identity of 
interest [such that] 'the real parties in interest were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them 
unofficially, from an early stage.1" Sulzen v. Williams, 977 
P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Doxev-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)). See also Wilcox, 911 P.2d 
at 369-70 ("'[A]n amendment which substitutes or adds new parties 
. . . relat[es] back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when 
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'") 
(quoting Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906). 
1J19 We conclude, as a matter of law, that Bank One and Dime 
Savings had a sufficient identity of interest with Willowcreek 
Plaza and were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings resulting 
from the second complaint. Thus, the action commenced with the 
fourth complaint is substantially the same as that commenced with 
the second complaint and, therefore, is within the scope of 
section 78-12-40. In Sulzen, we held that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying amendment to the complaint's caption to 
substitute parties where the proper parties were named in the 
body of the complaint and served with process. See Sulzen, 977 
P.2d at 501 ("'"Tf the body of the complaint correctly identifies 
the party . . . courts generally will allow an amendment under 
7 . (...continued) 
that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured." 51 Am. Jur. 
2d Limitation of Actions § 17, at 602-03 (1970). 
8. Significantly, both sides have applied Rule 15(c) analysis in 
their briefs, thus implicitly recognizing that this approach is 
appropriate. 
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Rule 15 to correct technical defects in the caption. " ! ff) (quoting 
Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 370) (other citation omitted; omission in 
original). This case is remarkably similar. That is/ 
notwithstanding the second complaint's caption, Bank One and Dime 
Savings were described as defendants in the body of the complaint 
and were actually served. This is sufficient notice to bring the 
fourth complaint within the savings statute as a matter of law.9 
CONCLUSION 
^20 We hold that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants Bank One and Dime Savings. By 
its plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) allows a 
plaintiff to refile a new action each time a prior action fails 
other than on the merits, provided the new action is filed within 
one year of such failure. However, because the renewed action 
must be substantially the same as that in the prior action, new 
parties may be added only if, because of sufficient identity of 
interest, the addition is not prejudicial. In this case, Bank 
One and Dime Savings had such an identity of interest with 
Willowcreek Plaza and no prejudice is apparent. Therefore 
section 78-12-40 applies to Hebertson's fourth complaint 
notwithstanding the change in the caption. Accordingly, we 
reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial or 
such other proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
Gregory &: Orme, Judge 
H21 WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
9. Additional facts indicate Bank One and Dime Savings had 
actual notice and reinforce this conclusion. For example, Bank 
One and Dime Savings's insurance carrier had notice of 
Hebertson's claim and injuries only a few days after the incident 
and long before Hebertson filed any action. 
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Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Compiler's Notes. — The Advisory Com-
ment deleted circuit courts from the list of mittee Note to Rule 42 also applies to this rule, 
courts in Subdivision (c)(2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v Anderson, 910 R2d 1229 Social Servs. v Sucec, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah 
(Utah 1996), State v Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 1996). 
(Utah 1996), State ex rel Utah State Dep't of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L Rev 150. 
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but 
is pursued in an appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the 
appellate court, either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, shall 
transfer the case, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders, 
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the 
case. The clerk of the transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to 
the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring the case. The time for filing 
all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
schedule of the receiving court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4C is and Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the 
renumbered as Rule 44. It is amended to permit review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Pro-
the transfer of an appeal that is timely but vided that all parties have notice of the intent 
improperly filed not only between the Supreme to seek judicial review, the same policy consid-
Court and Court of Appeals but also to the erations that permit the transfer of an improp-
District Court. Under the Administrative Pro- erly filed appeal between the Supreme Court 
cedures Act, the District Court has jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals should permit the 
to review informal adjudicative proceedings of transfer of such a case to the District Court, 
administrative agencies. The Supreme Court 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Padilla v. Utah Bd. of 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Garcia, 805 P.2d Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 45. Review of judgments , orders, and decrees of 
court of appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions'') of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerat ions governing review of coi t iorari . 
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The 
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
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with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
the Supreme Court. 
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that 
the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a 
recommendation by motion or otherwise. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 
(Utah 1992). 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint 
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties. 
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested jointly, 
severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of 
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition Separately; or any two or more 
of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it will 
suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. A 
cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other filing. 
(b) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the 
parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of such 
notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party noted 
as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with service 
on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition. 
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to 
file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to 
action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an order to 
have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court certify the 
record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to the Supreme Court. 
Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme 
Court should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to the Supreme 
Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such 
understanding cannot be derived from the contents of the petition or the brief 
in opposition, including the appendix. If a motion is appropriate, it shall be 
made to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but prior to action by 
the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case of a stay of execution of a 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion may be made before the filing 
of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme Court or any party to the 
ca$e may request that additional parts of the record be certified and transmit-
ted to the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the final 
decision by the Court of Appeals. The docket fee shall be paid at the time of 
filing the petition. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a writ 
of certiorari which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or 
which is not accompanied by the docket fee. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of Appeals, 
not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If a petition for rehearing 
is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari 
for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or of the entry of a 
subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this 
rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of 
another party to the case is granted. 
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition. The 
clerk shall refuse any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket fee. 
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other 
filing. The clerk of the court shall refuse any filing so joined. 
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, 
whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise 
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the 
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the same as provided 
in Rule 26. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Procedural default to his incarceration in Nevada, he had no 
—Cause reasonable access to, or notice of, Utah appel-
late rules and, thus, he should be afforded the 
Procedural default opportunity to prove that these circumstances 
Cause did in fact exist for purposes of excusing the 
Petitioner seeking federal habeas review suf- default Dulin v Cook, 957 R2d 758 (10th Cir. 
ficiently alleged "cause" for his procedural de- 1992) 
fault under this rule when he claimed that, due 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari* 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated: 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme 
Court contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities cited, 
with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circum-
stances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of the 
questions should be short and concise and should not>be argumentative or 
repetitious. General .conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court of Appeals 
is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The statement of a 
question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly 
included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions issued by 
the Court of Appeals. 
(6) .A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and the date of 
the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of time within which 
to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is 
filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of certiorari in connection 
with whiqh the cross-petition is filed; and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme 
Court. 
(7) Controlling .provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and regu-
lations set forth verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the controlling 
provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice and their 
pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph 
(10) of this paragraph. 
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in the 
lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall b§ supported by citations to the record before and to the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals. 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument 
explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46 for the 
issuance of the writ. 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, and 
all orders, including any order oja rehearing, delivered by the Court of Appeals 
in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders, 
judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in companion cases by 
the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by administrative agencies and 
that are relevant to the questions presented. Each document shall include the 
caption showing the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number 
of the case, and the date of its entry; and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are relevant 
to the questions presented but were not entered in the case that is the subject 
of the petition. 
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this 
paragraph is voluminous, they may be separately presented. 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in 
subparagraph (a)(9) of this rule. The'petitioner shall not file a separate brief in 
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support of a petition for a writ of certiorari. If the petition is granted, the 
petitioner will be notified of the date on which the brief in support of the merits 
of the case is due. 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may. not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table of 
authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) of this 
rule, and the appendix. 
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity The failure of a petitioner to 
present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and 
adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae, 
(a) Brief in opposition Within 30 days after service of a petition the 
respondent shall file an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why 
the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Such brief shall comply 
with Rules 26(b), 27 and, as applicable, 49. 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the 
appendix 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief 
in opposition 
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, the 
petition and the brief in opposition, if any, will be distributed by the clerk for 
consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed, 
distribution of both it and the petition for a writ certiorari will be delayed until 
the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the expiration of the 
time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file. 
(e) Reply brief A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the brief 
m opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under paragraph 
(d) of this rule will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief. Such 
brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such brief 
shall comply with Rules 26(b) and 27 
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Cotut' 
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme Court. A motion for leave 
shall identify the interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why d! 
brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent^ 
an amicus curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose1 
position it will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause shown shall grant1 
leave for later filing, in which event it shall specify within what period aflJ 
opposing party may answer. Such brief shall comply with Rules 26(b), 27, and, 
as applicable, 49. The brief may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject1 
index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule1 
49(a)(7), and the appendix. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992,) 
Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Order after consideration After consideration of the documents distruw 
uted pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying tb« 
xvuie ox 
petition or granting the petition in whole or in part. The order shall be decided 
summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision 
on the merits. The clerk shall not issue a formal writ unless directed by the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Grant of petition. 
(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals and counsel of record. 
(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court shall request the clerk of the court with custody of the record to certify 
it and transmit it to the Supreme Court. 
(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on 
which it was filed and the date on which petitioner's brief is due. 
(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the 
petition for writ of certiorari. In applying Rules 24 through 31, the petitioner 
shall stand in the place of the appellant and the respondent in the place of the 
appellee. 
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, 
an order to that effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
